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Abstract
Horizontal mergers are usually under the scrutiny of antitrust au-
thorities due to their potential undesirable e¤ects on prices and con-
sumer surplus. Ex-post evidence, however, suggests that not always
these e¤ects take place and even relevant mergers may end up having
negligible price e¤ects. The analysis of mergers in the context of non-
localized spatial competition may o¤er a further interpretation to the
ones proposed in the literature: in this framework both positive and
zero price e¤ects are possible outcomes of the merger activity.
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1 Introduction
Antitrust authorities worldwide are highly concerned with the price e¤ects
of mergers (Whinston, 2007). When two or more rms operating in the same
market merge, the concentration of the market increases and this may drive
to undesirable increases in prices with a consequent damage for consumers.
According to Weinberg (2008), the agencies review mergers in an e¤ort to
identify and block mergers if they would increase prices. For these reasons
several approaches have been developed in the literature and by the practi-
tioners to evaluate the price e¤ects: "event studies" based on the behaviour
of the stock markets evaluation of the companies involved, "simulation stud-
ies" based on theoretical models of mergers and appropriately parametrized
and "direct studies" of the price e¤ects within a specic industry (Pautler,
2001; Weinberg, 2008). Although the literature mainly focuses on price in-
creasing mergers, as they a¤ect consumers and societys welfare, a number
of papers also provide ex-post evidence of little or no price e¤ect of merging
activity: a common trait of the retrospective evidence available is that not
always anti-competitive e¤ects arise (Ashenfelter et al., 2009). Ashenfelter
and Hosken (2010) nd that in two of the ve mergers that they consider,
no substantial price e¤ect was registered. In particular, the Aurora-Kraft
syrup merger had almost no e¤ect while the Marathon-Ashland joint ven-
ture in the gasoline sector had negative (although non-signicant) medium
term e¤ects on prices; the latter case is also discussed by Taylor and Ho-
sken (2007) with similar conclusions. Ashenfelter et al. (2011) document
Whirlpools acquisition of Maytage, a merger of two large manufacturers
of appliances. They nd no change in the prices of washing machines and
sensible price increase only for some categories of products. Simpson and
Taylor (2008) analyse the e¤ects of MAPs 1999 acquisition of Ultraman
Diamond Shamrocks terminaling assets on retail prices in Michigan: they
analyse gasoline prices in six cities for a period of ve years and nd no evid-
ence that the transaction led to higher prices. In the same sector, Csorba et
al. (2011) obtain economically negligible price e¤ects studying two almost
2
simultaneous mergers in the Hungarian retail gasoline market. In Spain,
the acquisition by DISA of Shells activities leads to no signicant e¤ect on
pricing (Jiménez and Perdiguero, 2012). Neumann and Sanderson (2007)
analyse the Corus and WIC merger by collecting information from market
participants through interviews, other studies and from public sources about
post-merger conditions. Although their evidence might have a limited value,
they conclude that price increases are mostly attributed to ination.
Several explanations for no-price e¤ect of mergers have been proposed:
the e¢ ciency gains argument is the most common and it is used by most
rms in defending a mergers proposal; another factor may be collusion in
the market before a merger takes place (Jiménez and Perdiguero, 2012); or
the competitive e¤ect of actual (Ashenfelter and Hosken, 2010; Taylor and
Hosken, 2007) or potential substitutes (Ashenfelter et. al., 2009). How-
ever, the retrospective evidence is mixed and does not always support the
proposed explanations. Connor et al. (1998), for example, analyse general
hospitalsmergers: they nd a 5% price decrease in merging hospitals rel-
ative to non-merging ones. In addition, they nd that costs also decrease
by about 5% in the merging hospitals, indicating an almost perfect pass-
through of the cost-savings on prices. Csorba et al. (2011) believe that no
price e¤ect derives from managerial decisions to stick with the pre-merger
pricing policies, while Neumann and Sanderson (2007) and Simpson and
Taylor (2008) provide no interpretation at all. This paper proposes a simple
theoretical analysis of mergers in di¤erentiated product industries which
may provide a further explanation for the ex-post evidence on the price ef-
fects of a merger. In our framework, in fact, some horizontal mergers induce
substantial price e¤ects while others do not have any e¤ect at all.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 locates our
contribution in the literature. Section 3 briey reviews the spokes model
and its properties. Mergers are introduced in section 4. Section 5 discusses
the price e¤ects of mergers, comparing the pre-merger with the post-merger
equilibria. Concluding remarks follow in section 6.
3
2 Related literature and contribution
We study the e¤ects of horizontal mergers in the context of "non-localized"
competition. The "traditional" approach to spatial competition uses the
circular city model of Vickrey (1964), also referred to as the Salop (1979)
model: one of its limits is to only allow to address "localized" spatial com-
petition (Rothschild, 2000). Chen and Riordan (2007a) develop a new tool
to analyse spatial di¤erentiation which naturally ts to the idea of "non-
localized" competition, the spokes model. In this model rms are located at
the extreme of a market constituted of several spokes all linked at a common
centre. There may be more spokes than rms (Chen and Riordan, 2007a)
or as many spokes as rms (Caminal and Claici, 2007). The model has
two main properties. First, it allows to study multi-rm spatial competition
with no neighbouring e¤ects; second, when the number of rms tends to
innity, it captures the idea of monopolistic competition à la Chamberlin.
The model is particularly useful to analyse markets in which consumers have
a strong preference for a specic brand while being rather indi¤erent among
alternatives: natural examples are markets for composite goods that require
original parts to be completed or repaired. In a merger context, the spokes
approach has a desirable feature: competition is non-localized and, in equi-
librium, all rms are competing against each other. The e¤ect of a merger
is then to reduce the intensity of competition. The price e¤ect, however,
depends on which segment of the market rms are targeting when setting
prices. The demand for the rmsproduct is composed of several segments
characterized by di¤erent elasticities. There exist, then, equilibria in which
mergers have important price e¤ects: these mergers also imply demand ef-
fects that lead to increased transportation costs and, consequently, negative
welfare e¤ects. However, if rms target a "kink" of the demand function,
equilibria with no price e¤ect arise as in Economides (1989, 1993). These
results can be interpreted as a further possible explanation of the mixed
evidence on the price e¤ects of mergers in the empirical literature.
The contribution of this paper is also related to the literature on en-
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dogenous mergers. The goal of many papers on this topic is to solve the
paradoxes posed by the game theoretical analysis of mergers and coalition
formation. One of the puzzles is that under price competition and di¤eren-
tiated products, mergers are always protable for insiders (Deneckere and
Davidson, 1985). However, the equilibrium displays free-riding properties:
"outsiders" earn higher prots than "insiders". This property also charac-
terizes our analysis: in the regions where prices increase following a merger,
outsidersprices and prots raise more than the ones of insiders. In other
instances, however, prices do not increase. Brito (2003) considers mergers
in the context of the circular city. He shows that even if market power is the
motivation for a merger, rms may want to be insiders (preemptive merger)
and the impact of the merger on the rival rms depends on their locations.
Firms may prefer to be insiders even if some outsiders benet more (but
others less). In this context, he nds that mergers have relevant impacts
on prices only if one of the neighbouring rms takes part into it. On the
contrary, our zero-price e¤ect result is not related to the proximity of rms,
which plays no relevant role in the spokes model. Braid (1999) considers
two-dimensional competition between rms located on a grid: the price ef-
fects of a merger are lower due to a reduction in the benets of merging
for insiders. As opposed to standard single dimension models, this feature
implies that the incentives to raise prices are spread in di¤erent directions.
Our results contribute to the rapidly ourishing literature on the spokes
model as a tool for analysis of multi-rm di¤erentiated product competi-
tion.1 In this context Caminal and Granero (2012), who analyse the role of
multi-product rms in supplying variety, is the closest paper to ours. They
consider a continuous approximation of the model in which a multi-product
rm competes against a fringe. In our paper, a merger also results in consti-
1The spokes model is used, between others, by Caminal and Claici (2007) in the context
of loyalty rewarding schemes; Germano (2009) and Germano and Meier (2010) to analyze
the information bias; Caminal (2010) on the supply of content in a bilingual environment;
Ganuza and Hauk (2005) to address allocation of ideas in tournaments; Mantovani and
Ruiz-Aliseda (2011) to analyse innovation in presence of complements and Chen and
Riordan (2007b) on vertical integration.
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tuting a multi-product rm; however, di¤erently from Caminal and Granero
(2012), we consider all four equilibrium regions that characterise the spokes
model. Moreover, we focus on the price e¤ects of a merger rather than on the
market provision of variety. Finally, the multi-product rm resulting from
the merger competes against other rms of comparable size rather than a
fringe.
Taking into account asymmetries may be quite complex in other models
of product di¤erentiation as the circular city model (Brito, 2003; Borla, 2012;
Syverson, 2004; Vogel, 2008; Alderighi and Piga, 2012). In our approach the
non-localized nature of competition avoids complex feedback e¤ects on the
prices of neighbouring rms; this property may strengthen the case for the
spokes model as a convenient and reasonable alternative to the circular city
in addressing spatial competition between several rms.
3 The Framework
Consider the model introduced by Chen and Riordan (2007a). The market
has a spatial structure made up of N spokes of constant length 1=2, with a
common centre; n rms are on the market, with n  N exogenously given.
Each rm is located at the extreme of its own spoke and supplies an ho-
mogeneous good: transportation costs are the only source of di¤erentiation.
Customers are uniformly distributed over all the N spokes. Consumers have
unit demand and their evaluation of the good is v, the transport cost is nor-
malized to one and the marginal cost to zero. Tractability requires that
consumers only like the brand located on their spoke and a nite subset of
the N   1 alternative brands: as Chen and Riordan (2007a) it is assumed
that any random consumer on a spoke likes only one alternative brand. No-
tice that if n < N; a consumer may not nd available the rst or the second
brand or both: in that case the market is not fully covered.
The prot function of a given rm i is:
i(pi; p i) = piDi(pi; p i)
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From rm is viewpoint there are di¤erent types of customers:2
1. Customers on i-th rms spoke that have one of the remaining rms as
an alternative. The demand from this group is dened by identifying
the location x^ of the consumers who are indi¤erent between buying
from i or buying from the rival rm :
x^ = max

min

1
2
+
p   pi
2
; 1

0

The constraints are imposed to ensure that the consumer is located on
either of the spokes and not outside.
2. Customers on the i-th rms spoke who do not have an existing al-
ternative brand and customers who do not have a rst favorite brand
but have i as a second favorite. The marginal consumer in the set of
these two types is identied by:
x = max fmin fv   pi; 1g ; 0g
Simplifying the constraints, the demand function is dened by the fol-
lowing segments:
Di(pi; p i) =
8>>>><>>>>:
2
N
1
N 1
P
 6=i
 
1
2 +
p pi
2

+ 2N
N n
N 1 (v   pi) if 12  v   pi  1
2
N
1
N 1
P
 6=i
 
1
2 +
p pi
2

+ 2N
N n
N 1 if v   pi > 1
(1)
where 2=N is the mass of consumers on each spoke, 1=(N 1) is the probab-
ility of rm  being a customerssecond favorite brand and (N n)=(N 1)
is the probability of a consumer having no rst or no second favorite brand
available. The following regularity conditions need to be satised: jp pij <
1; 8 6= i; and v pi  1=2 to ensure that competition between rms occurs.
The rst order conditions identifying the equilibrium prices are given by:
2Despite being aware of the existence of di¤erent types of customers, rms use a unique
price and do not price discriminate.
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Figure 1: The Spokes Model, Chen-Riordan (2007a), n = 5, N = 8.
@i
@pi
= Di(pi; p i) + pi
@Di(pi; p i)
@pi
= 0
Given the denition of the demand and prot functions, it can be checked
that there exist four possible equilibrium regions.3 The equilibrium regions
are characterized depending on v, the parameter capturing consumerseval-
uation of the good; the equilibrium prices before a merger takes place, pbm,
are dened as in Table 1:
Table 1. Before Merger Equilibrium Prices.
Region Range pbm
1bm vbm1D =
2(N 1)
n 1 < v  1 + (2N n 1)
2
2(N n)(n 1) = v
bm
1U
(2N n 1)
n 1
2bm vbm2D = 2  v  2(N 1)n 1 = vbm2U v   1
3bm vbm3D =
1
2
4N n 3
2N n 1 < v < 2 = v
bm
3U
2v(N n)+(n 1)
4N 3n 1
4bm vbm4D = 1  v  12 4N n 32N n 1 = vbm4U v   12
3The details of the derivations can be found in Proposition 1 of Chen and Riordan
(2007a).
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Figure 2: The before merger equilibrium prices, Chen-Riordan (2007a).
As illustrated in Figure 2 the price is a non-decreasing function of the
value of the good v. For values of v above vbm1U = 1 +
(2N n 1)2
2(N n)(n 1) a pure
strategy equilibrium of the game does not exist: a too large valuation of
the good implies rms have a unilateral incentive to raise their price to
p = v 1 which is however not an equilibrium either. Our analysis will focus
on the equilibrium Regions 1bm-4bm: more details on the features of these
equilibria are provided in Chen and Riordan (2007a) and are also discussed
in Section 5.2. For even lower values of v an equilibrium would exist but all
rms would be local monopolists serving only part of the consumers located
on their spoke.
4 Horizontal Mergers
Following the literature, it is assumed that the merging rms maximize their
joint prots. The after merger prots are split in equal parts between the
participating rms and we abstract from bargaining considerations: in other
words, the only e¤ect of a merger is to create a multi-product rm.
9
4.1 The E¤ects of a Merger
Suppose that a merger of k of the n rms, k < n, takes place creating M .
Denote by i 2 I = f1; :::; kg a rm belonging to M . All other rms are
symmetric and indexed by i 2 O = fk + 1; :::; ng. Let us denote by S the
set of all rms (S = I [ O). In a market featuring N spokes, the number
of active rms reduces to m = n  k + 1.
Focus rst on the merged rms who constitutedM . The following equation:
v   pi   x = v   pj   (1  x) 8i 2 I; 8j 2 S;8j 6= i
still identies the indi¤erent customers who have an alternative brand ex-
isting on the market and the set of indi¤erent consumers is described by:
x^ij = max

min

1
2
+
pj   pi
2
; 1

0

8i 2 I; 8j 2 S;8j 6= i
Notice, however, that now there are two subsets of indi¤erent consumers:
consumers whose other brand is supplied by one of the other rms taking
part to the merger (j 2 M; j 6= i) and consumers whose other brand is
supplied by one of the outsiders (j 2 O). Indi¤erent customers with no kind
of alternative brand are still identied by:
xi = max fmin fv   pi; 1g ; 0g 8i 2 I
To sum up, from the perspective of one of the rms who took part to the
merger and constituted rm M there are three types of customers after the
merger; hence, a randomly drawn customer is of a certain type with the
following probabilities:
1. k 1N 1 : probability of a customer that has its second favourite brand
supplied by rms located on other spokes but belonging to M ;
2. n kN 1 : probability of a customer that has an alternative brand not
supplied by other factories a¢ liated to M ;
3. N nN 1 : probability of a customer that does not have a second favourite
brand.
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The merger does not necessarily imply a market expansion e¤ect: the
agents that do not have a rst or a second favourite brand available are still
excluded: the fraction of this type of consumers is una¤ected by the merging
activity.
The demand function of the mergerM is dened by the sum of the segments
served by the k rms. Proceeding in a similar way as in the benchmark case,
the demand for each of the k segments is given by:
Di(pi; p i) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
2
N
1
N 1
kP
=1
 6=i
 
1
2 +
p pi
2

+ 2N
1
N 1
nP
=k+1
 
1
2 +
p pi
2

+ 2N
N n
N 1 (v   pi)
if 12  v   pi  1
2
N
1
N 1
kP
=1
 6=i
 
1
2 +
p pi
2

+ 2N
1
N 1
nP
=k+1
 
1
2 +
p pi
2

+ 2N
N n
N 1
if v   pi > 1
(2)
The rst term between square brackets represents consumers with both fa-
vourite brands being supplied byM . The second term represents consumers
whose second favourite brand is supplied by one of the outsider rms. The
third term identies the demand of the consumers whose only desired brand
is supplied by rm i. The demand of each of these segments is weighted
by the respective probabilities of a given consumer being one of the three
possible types described above.
Turning to outsider rms, their demand is:
Dj(pj ; p j) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
2
N
1
N 1
kP
=1

1
2 +
p pj
2

+ 2N
1
N 1
nP
=k+1
 6=j

1
2 +
p pj
2

+ 2N
N n
N 1 (v   pj)
if 12  v   pj  1
2
N
1
N 1
kP
=1

1
2 +
p pj
2

+ 2N
1
N 1
nP
=k+1
 6=j

1
2 +
p pj
2

+ 2N
N n
N 1
if v   pj > 1
(3)
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For each case, the three terms represent, respectively, the demand faced
from consumers who have, as other favourite, a brand supplied by rms in
M , consumers who have, as other favourite, a brand supplied by another
non-merged rm and consumers whose only desired brand is supplied by the
rm. The prot functions for the merged entity and for each outsider are
respectively:
M =
kX
=1
pD(p; p )
j = pjDj(pj ; p j) 8j 2 O
The rst order conditions for the merged and the non-merged rms are,
respectively:
@i
@pi
= Di(pi; p i) + pi
@Di(pi; p i)
@pi
+
kX
=1
 6=i
p
@D(p; p )
@pi
= 0 (4)
@j
@pj
= Dj(pj ; p j) + pj
@Dj(pj ; p j)
@pj
= 0 8 i 2 I;8 j 2 O (5)
Comparing (4) and (5), the e¤ect of the merger is to lead each of the par-
ticipating rms to internalize the externalities imposed by ones own price
choices on the demand for other brands in the merger. This property, rst
illustrated by Deneckere and Davidson (1985), plays an important role in
determining the results and it is further discussed in Section 5. As in the
benchmark, regularity conditions, i.e. jp   pij < 1; 8 2 I;8i 2 I;  6= i,
have to be imposed.
4.2 The After-Merger Equilibrium
The after merger equilibrium regions and corresponding prices for the merged
and non-merged rms, denoted by pm and pnm, are characterized in Pro-
position 1.
Proposition 1 In presence of an horizontal merger of k rms, constituting
M , four equilibrium regions can be identied; they are characterized by the
12
following prices and hold for the following ranges of values of v:
Region Range pm pnm
1am ]vam1D ; v
am
1U ]
(2N n 1)(2n 1)
(n k)(2n+k 2)
(2N n 1)(2n k)
(n k)(2n+k 2)
2am [vam2D ; v
am
2U ] v   1 v   1
3am ]vam3D ; v
am
3U [
(4N 2n 1)[2v(N n)+n 1]
	
(4N 2n k)[2v(N n)+n 1]
	
4am [vam4D ; v
am
4U ] v   12 v   12
where: 	 = 16N2   20Nn   4Nk   4N + 6n2 + 3nk + 2n   k2 + 2k and
vamlD = maxfvmlD; vnmlD g, vamlU = minfvmlU ; vnmlU g, 8l = 1; 2; 3; 4; provided that:
vam4D  vam4U  vam3D  vam3U  vam2D  vam2U  vam1D  vam1U .
Proof see Appendix A.
All the expressions for the threshold values of v are reported in the Ap-
pendix. The derivation of the price expressions is quite straightforward using
the demand functions identied in (2)-(3) and the corresponding rst-order
conditions (4)-(5); nding the values for which the after merger equilibrium
regions exist is more elaborate: the steps closely follow the Proof of Propos-
ition 1 in Chen and Riordan (2007a), and are reported in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 implies that four equilibrium regions, Regions 1am-4am,
can be identied also in case a merger takes place; these are the analogous of
Regions 1bm-4bm in the benchmark case. As a result of the merger, insider
and outsider rms choose di¤erent prices and, consequently, face potential
deviations with di¤erent protability; hence, the equilibrium prices hold for
di¤erent values of the parameter v and Regions 1am-4am are dened as
the intersection of these regions for both insiders and outsiders. It can be
noticed, then, that one e¤ect of the merger is to reduce the overall size
of values for which the four equilibrium regions are dened: as discussed in
more details in Section 5.2, however, other equilibrium regions exist between
the four dened by Proposition 1.
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5 Results and Discussion
5.1 The main result
Bringing together the results of the pre-merger benchmark situation in Sec-
tion 3 and the post-merger equilibrium in Section 4, we identify four equi-
librium regions.
Denition 1 Four equilibrium regions can be identied:
Region 1 v1D = maxfvam1D ; vbm1Dg < v  minfvam1U ; vbm1U g = v1U
Region 2 v2D = maxfvam2D ; vbm2Dg  v  minfvam2U ; vbm2U g = v2U
Region 3 v3D = maxfvam3D ; vbm3Dg < v < minfvam3U ; vbm3U g = v3U
Region 4 v4D = maxfvam4D ; vbm4Dg  v  minfvam4U ; vbm4U g = v4U
and they are characterized by the following before and after merger prices
for both insiders and outsiders:
Region pbm p

m p

nm
1 (2N n 1)n 1
(2N n 1)(2n 1)
(n k)(2n+k 2)
(2N n 1)(2n k)
(n k)(2n+k 2)
2 v   1 v   1 v   1
3 2v(N n)+(n 1)4N 3n 1
(4N 2n 1)[2v(N n)+n 1]
	
(4N 2n k)[2v(N n)+n 1]
	
4 v   12 v   12 v   12
where 	 = 16N2   20Nn  4Nk   4N + 6n2 + 3nk + 2n  k2 + 2k.
The four regions identied in Denition 1 can be seen as the analogous
of the ones analysed by Chen and Riordan (2007a) in the context of a mer-
ger: the values of parameters corresponding to each region are given by the
appropriate boundary between the ones dening the before and after merger
equilibria.4 As we shall see in Section 5.2, equilibria in these regions also
share many properties of the ones in Chen and Riordan (2007a), presen-
ted in Section 3. Having identied the equilibrium regions, we now provide
conditions on the parameters that guarantee that these regions exist.
4Formally, Regions 1 to 4 are identied as the intersection of Regions 1bm-4bm and
Regions 1am-4am, as dened in Section 3 and Proposition 1. The relevant prices are
derived from Table 1 (pbm) and Proposition 1 (p

m; p

nm).
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Lemma 1 Regions existence: (1) Region 1 exists provided that either: (i)
v1D = v
am
1D = v
m
1D < v1U = v
am
1U = v
m
1U which requires:
N  12n
3   8n2   8kn2   3k2n+ 10kn  k2 + k3   k
2 (2n  1) (2n  k)
or: (ii) v1D = vam1D = v
m
1D < v1U = v
nm
1U which requires either: (ii.a)
12n3   8n2   8kn2   3k2n+ 10kn  k2 + k3   k
2 (2n  1) (2n  k)  N 
6n2   2n  3kn+ 2k   k2
2 (2n  k)
and
n >
2k + 1
4
+
p
12k2   20k + 9
4
or: (ii.b)
12n3   8n2   8kn2   3k2n+ 10kn  k2 + k3   k
2 (2n  1) (2n  k)  N <
4n3   8n2   k   3k2n+ 8kn
2 (k   1) (2n  k)
and
k < n <
2k + 1
4
+
p
12k2   20k + 9
4
or: (iii) v1D = vam1D = v
m
1D < v1U = v
bm
1U which requires either: (iii.a)
N >
6n2   2n  3kn+ 2k   k2
2 (2n  k)
and
n >
2k + 1
4
+
p
12k2   20k + 9
4
or: (iii.b)
N >
2n3   6n2 + 4n+ k2n+ kn2 + k2   kn  2k
2 (k   1) (k + n  1)
and
k < n <
2k + 1
4
+
p
12k2   20k + 9
4
(2) Region 2 exists provided that v2D  v2U which requires: N  n + k 12 ;
(3) Region 3 exists provided that v3D < v3U which requires: N > 5n+3k 18 +p
n2+6n+9+21k2 6kn 30k
8 ; (4) Region 4 always exists as: v4D  v4U .
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Proof See Appendix B.
As Regions 1-4 are identied by the intersection between the before and
after merger regions, they do not necessarily need to exist: the lower and
upper boundaries may overlap and the equilibrium prices hold for no value of
v: Lemma 1 identies conditions on the number of spokes and rms for which
all four equilibrium regions exist. Section 5.2 discusses what happens if the
conditions provided in Lemma 1 do not hold; in the remaining, however, we
shall assume that these conditions are satised.
Our analysis focuses on the price e¤ects of a merger and now equilibrium
prices before and after the merger can be compared.
Proposition 2 A merger leads to an increase in the market price of all
rms in Region 1 and Region 3; it has no price e¤ect in Region 2 and
Region 4.
Proof See Appendix C.
The results in Proposition 2 are graphically illustrated in Figure 3 using
a specic parametrization. Before and after-merger prices are plotted in the
four equilibrium regions.5 As it can be seen, in Regions 1 and 3 the after-
merger market price dominates the before merger price; in Regions 2 and 4
the two prices coincide.
5.2 Discussion
Proposition 2 states that in two of the equilibrium regions prices increase
as a consequence of the merger while this is not the case in the remaining
two regions. We shall rst describe the mechanisms that lead to this result
before providing an interpretation.
In Region 1, "standard" oligopolistic competition takes place: as the
best response functions are upward sloping, both insiders and outsiders raise
5The after merger price is dened as the average of the prices of insider and outsider
rms, with the market shares as weights.
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Figure 3: The before and after merger equilibrium price comparison.
their prices, creating an overall increase of prices and earning higher prots
compared with the benchmark situation. The mechanisms described by
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) apply to mergers in most price competition
models and the spokes model is no exception: an outsider, rm j; faces
competition both from the rms constitutingM and from all other outsiders.
Then, rm j shares with a given insider, rm i; n  2 competitors; but both
rms face also another competitor. For the outsider rm j this competitor
is a member of the merger M , i.e. a rm charging a higher price. The
insider rm, on the other hand, faces competition of another outsider rm,
which is charging a lower price. Hence, the outsider j faces less erce price
competition and, consequently, its prots are higher than the ones of rms
in M .
In Region 2 a "kinked equilibrium" takes place as rms concentrate on
extracting surplus from consumers who do not have a second favourite brand
and are indi¤erent between buying or not. For this reason, the merger does
not a¤ect prices and prots. The same amount of consumers takes part to
the market and prices are una¤ected.
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Region 3 features a price increase similar to Region 1: the reason, how-
ever, is less intuitive in this case. Competition in this region implies extract-
ing all surplus from the marginal consumer who lacks a second alternative
brand. A consequence of this feature is that the elasticity of demand is lar-
ger on the monopolistic segment; this leads to price increasing competition.
Despite this, the mechanisms as in Region 1 are in operation: the best re-
sponse functions are still upward sloping so that prices of both insiders and
outsiders increase, leading also to an increase in prots with respect to the
benchmark situation.
In Region 4 the "kinked equilibrium" is of a di¤erent type: rms focus
their attention on the indi¤erent consumers who have its brand as a rst
choice. As in Region 3, also in this region not all consumers with at least
one favourite brand are served. However, as in Region 2, the kinked nature
of the equilibrium implies that the prices remain unchanged even when a
merger takes place.
The analysis of the four equilibrium regions has shown how several eco-
nomic mechanisms operate in the spokes model. These mechanisms determ-
ine the price e¤ects of an horizontal merger between rms. The results can
be interpreted as follows: when genuine price competition is in operation,
as in Regions 1 and 3, then the "free-riding" property of the equilibrium
takes place and the classical price increase result is conrmed. Such price
e¤ects imply that mergers have a negative impact not only on consumers but
also on overall welfare. Asymmetric price increases are reected on di¤erent
equilibrium demand shares for di¤erent rms: this leads to an increase of
overall transport costs, impacting negatively on welfare. "Kinked equilib-
ria", however, take place in Regions 2 and 4 and the equilibrium prices are
independent of whether a subset of rms merge. In other words, when rms
target a specic key segment of the market, mergers do not have any price
e¤ect. The results, then, seem to provide a relevant policy implication: if
a market is characterized by product di¤erentiation and non-localized price
competition, then a merger may not have detrimental e¤ects for consumers
and welfare. In fact, it was shown that in two of the four regions considered,
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mergers do not have any price e¤ect at all. The results of the model seem
consistent with the "ex-post" empirical evidence that not all mergers have
important price e¤ects, even when cost synergies, substitute goods, collusion
or other factors do not play a key role.
The regions in which no price e¤ect takes place do not capture a peculiar
or special case. First of all, the size of the sub-space of parameters for which
such equilibria take place may be non negligible as witnessed, for a specic
parametrization, by Figure 3. Secondly, in Region 4, rms focus on the
marginal consumer who does not have an alternative brand and hence they
only serve consumers on their own spoke; however, in Region 2, rms serve
all types of consumers apart from the ones which would be cut out of the
market in any case because none of the brands they like is available. In this
sense competition between rms is fully in operation.
The four regions discussed do not, of course, exhaust the space of para-
meters; further regions can be identied as, for example, in the shadowed
areas in Figure 3. In this paper we focused on Regions 1-4 for compar-
ability with Chen and Riordan (2007a). The results in the shaded regions
are quantitatively di¤erent from what we presented in this paper; qualitat-
ively, however, they are similar and do not add to the understanding and
interpretation of the price e¤ects. In those regions, in fact, a price increase
takes place following a merger in a similar fashion and for the same reasons
as in Region 1 and Region 3 presented above. This further implies that if
any of the Regions 1-3 does not exist, as by Lemma 1, regions with similar
characteristics still exist.
6 Conclusions
Antitrust authorities focus much of their attention on the price e¤ects of
mergers: when two or more rms operating in the same market merge,
the concentration of the market increases and this may drive to undesir-
able price e¤ects. This paper provides a simple theoretical interpretation
of the price e¤ects of horizontal mergers which seems consistent with the
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empirical evidence: many mergers have an important impact on prices but
cases of negligible price e¤ects are not rare either. Negligible price e¤ects
may have several explanations: the outcome of cost synergies between the
merged rms, prior collusion between rms or others that the literature has
suggested; however, negligible price e¤ects may simply result from market
interactions: our paper provides a theoretical underpinning for the latter
possibility. The results are provided through the analysis of horizontal mer-
gers in a context of spatial but non-localized competition: two key features
of the spokes model, a recently introduced tool to address non-localized
competition, are that proximity between rms plays no role and that not all
spokes may feature a rm located on it. These properties allow to identify
four types of equilibria with di¤erent features. In two of the equilibria, sens-
ible price e¤ects take place and the "free riding" mechanism described by
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) is in operation. The merger modies rms
reaction functions and drives both insiders and outsiders to raise their prices,
with consequent harm to consumersand overall welfare. The latest e¤ect
operates through increased transportation costs due to the asymmetric de-
mand e¤ects of price increases. The two remaining equilibria, however, have
di¤erent properties: in those, rms focus only on a specic type of consumer.
Mergers then have no e¤ects on prices, which are simply determined by the
"kink" in the demand function that is targeted by rms. The results, then,
suggest that a merger will not necessarily imply a sharp increase in the price
level: whether this is the case or not will actually depend on the type of
consumers that rms are targeting when setting their prices.
The results provided do not exhaust the applicability of the spokes model
for the analysis of the e¤ects of horizontal mergers. First, in our framework
free entry may change rms incentives to merge: a more relaxed pricing
environment might induce further entry on the empty spokes with the pos-
sibility of further reducing merged rmsprot. The interaction between
mergers and entry constitutes an interesting direction to extend the model.
Secondly, the spokes model can be used to address some of the questions
posed by the endogenous mergers literature. Firms might di¤er in two di-
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mensions: marginal cost and the number of varieties produced. In such a
setting, one could evaluate which rms would merge and with what con-
sequences. For example, as in Pita Barros (1998) and Socorro (2004), a
merger between some rms with asymmetric production costs may imply
that the merged rms can produce at a cost equal to the most e¢ cient of its
participants. Thus a merger entails a rationalisation gain since production
can be re-allocated from a high-cost to a low-cost plant. The evaluation
of the e¤ects of similar mergers in the context of the spokes model is an
interesting topic for future research.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
As reported in the proposition, there are two types of rms (rms consti-
tuting M and outsiders j) and four candidate equilibrium prices for each.
Following similar steps as the Proof of Proposition 1 in Chen and Riordan
(2007a), this proof identies the equilibrium prices and the values of v for
which each candidate prices constitute an equilibrium.
Region 1am
Merged entity M : from the system of the rst order conditions (4) and
(5), evaluated using the second expressions in (2) and (3), the candidate
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equilibrium price for all rms constitutingM is: pm =
(2N n 1)(2n 1)
(n k)(2n+k 2) : From
(2), the equilibrium requires v   pm > 1; hence:
v > vm1D = 1 +
(2N   n  1)(2n  1)
(n  k)(2n+ k   2) : (6)
As both the rst order and second order conditions are satised at the
candidate equilibrium, the most protable possible deviation for rm M is
to increase the price so that it reaches the demand kink at pD = v   1; in
that case, it is most protable for the rm to change all k prices rather than
only a subset of them. If all k prices change, the deviation is not protable
if: M  DM =
kP
i=1
(v   1)Di(pD; pnm). The latter implies that the possible
deviation is not protable for rm M provided that:
v  vm1U = 1+
(2n  1)2
(n  k)
(2N   n  1)2
(2n+ k   2) [4n(N   n)  2N + n(k + 1) + (k   1)2]
(7)
It follows that the candidate prices are an equilibrium forM for the following
values of v: vm1D < v  vm1U :
Outsider rm j: from the system of the rst order conditions (4) and
(5), evaluated using the second expressions in (2) and (3), the candidate
equilibrium price for a representative non-merged rm j (j 2 O) is: pnm =
(2N n 1)(2n k)
(n k)(2n+k 2) : From (2), the equilibrium requires v   pnm > 1; hence:
v > vnm1D = 1 +
(2N   n  1)(2n  k)
(n  k)(2n+ k   2) : (8)
As both the rst order and second order conditions are satised at the
candidate equilibrium, the most protable possible deviation for rm j is
to increase the price so that it reaches the demand kink at pD = v   1; the
deviation is not protable if j  Dj = (v   1)Di(pm; pD; pnm). From the
latter, the possible deviation is not protable for rm M provided that:
v  vnm1U = 1 +
(2n  k)2
(n  k)
(2N   n  1)2
(2n+ k   2) [2(N   n)(2n  k) + k(k   1)] (9)
25
It follows that the candidate price is an equilibrium for outsider rms
for the following values of v: vnm1D < v  vnm1U :
By comparing (6) and (8), vm1D is larger than v
nm
1D and, as such, consti-
tutes the stricter of the two constraints to guarantee that no rm has an
incentive to deviate. A similar comparison on (7) and (9) is not conclus-
ive. Hence, the candidate prices constitute an equilibrium for the following
values of v:
vam1D = maxfvm1D; vnm1D g = vm1D < v  minfvm1U ; vnm1U g = vam1U
Region 2am
Merged entity M : the candidate equilibrium price is pm = v   1: The
merged rm M may consider to change h of its k prices (1  h  k). The
two possible deviations are to higher prices: pi > v   1 or to a lower prices:
pi < v 1. Suppose rstM considers to increase h of its prices to pi > v 1.
In that case they face a demand given by the second expression in (2). All
other rms stick to their equilibrium prices. Such potential deviation is not
protable provided that:
dM
dp
=
kX
i=1
@i
@pi
dpi jpi>v 1;pm; pnm 0;8i 2 I
where dpi = 0 for all the remaining (k   h) prices that are not changed.
As the deviation prot increases in h, the most protable possible deviation
takes place as h = k. Hence, to ensure that the possible deviation is not
guaranteeing more prots than at the equilibrium requires:
v  vm2D =
4N   2n  k   1
2N   n  k (10)
Suppose now that M considers to change h prices to pi < v  1. In that
case they face a demand given by the rst expression in (2). All other rms
stick to their equilibrium prices. Such potential deviation is not protable
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provided that:
dM
dp
=
kX
i=1
@i
@pi
dpi jpi<v 1;pm; pnm 0;8i 2 I
where dpi = 0 for all the remaining (k   h) prices that are not changed.
As the deviation prot increases in h, the most protable possible deviation
takes place as h = k. The possible deviation should not lead to higher prots
than at the candidate equilibrium; this requires the following condition:
v  vm2U =
2N   k   1
n  k (11)
It follows that the candidate prices are an equilibrium for M for the
following values of v: vm2D  v  vm2U :
Outsider rm j: the candidate equilibrium price for a representative
non-merged rm j (j 2 O) is pnm = v   1; an analogous reasoning can be
used to rule out possible deviations. Suppose that rm j considers raising
its price to pj > v  1. In that case the demand faced is given by the second
expression in (3). Such potential deviation is not protable provided that:
@j
@pj
jpm;pnm;pj>v 1= pj
@Dj
@pj
+Dj jpm;pnm;pj>v 1 0;8j 2 O
which is equivalent to require:
v  vnm2D = 2 (12)
Suppose rm j consider decreasing the price to pj < v   1. In that
case the demand faced is given by the rst expression of (3). Such potential
deviation is not protable provided that:
@j
@pj
jpm;pnm;pj<v 1= pj
@Dj
@pj
+Dj jpm;pnm;pj<v 1 0;8j 2 O
which is equivalent to:
v  vnm2U = 2
N   1
n  1 (13)
27
It follows that the candidate price is an equilibrium for outsider rms
for the following values of v: vnm2D  v  vnm2U :
By comparing (10) and (12), vm2D is larger than v
nm
2D ; a similar comparison
on (11) and (13) leads to conclude that vm2U is smaller than v
nm
2U so that the
candidate prices constitute an equilibrium for:
vam2D = maxfvm2D; vnm2D g = vm2D  v  minfvm2U ; vnm2U g = vm2U = vam2U :
Region 3am
Merged entity M : the system of the rst order conditions (4) and (5),
evaluated using the rst expressions in (2) and (3) provide the candidate
equilibrium prices for the merged rm M : pm =
(4N 2n 1)[2v(N n)+n 1]
	 :
From (2), the equilibrium requires 12 < v   pm < 1; implying:
v > vm3D =
16N2   4Nk   12Nn  12N   k2 + 3kn+ 2k + 2n2 + 4n+ 2
16N2   8Nk   16Nn  4N   2k2 + 6kn+ 4k + 4n2
(14)
and:
v < vm3U =
16N2   4Nk   16Nn  8N   k2 + 3kn+ 2k + 4n2 + 3n+ 1
8N2   4Nk   8Nn  2N   k2 + 3kn+ 2k + 2n2
(15)
It can be veried that the second order conditions are satised at the
candidate equilibrium prices. It follows that the candidate prices are an
equilibrium for M for the following values of v: vm3D < v < v
m
3U :
Outsider rm j: consider now a representative non-merged rm j (j 2
O); from the system of the rst order conditions (4) and (5), evaluated using
the rst expressions in (2) and (3), the candidate equilibrium price is: pnm =
(4N 2n k)[2v(N n)+n 1]
	 : By (2), the equilibrium requires
1
2 < v   pnm < 1;
implying:
v > vnm3D =
16N2   4Nk   12Nn  12N   k2 + kn+ 4k + 2n2 + 6n
16N2   4Nk   16Nn  8N   2k2 + 2kn+ 4k + 4n2 + 4n (16)
and:
v < vnm3U =
16N2   4Nk   16Nn  8N   k2 + 2kn+ 3k + 4n2 + 4n
8N2   2Nk   8Nn  4N   k2 + kn+ 2k + 2n2 + 2n (17)
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It can be veried that the second order conditions are satised at the can-
didate equilibrium price. It follows that pnm is the equilibrium price for rm
j for: vnm3D < v < v
nm
3U :
Comparing the thresholds, vm3D is larger than v
nm
3D and v
nm
3U is smaller
than vm3U . Hence, the candidate prices constitute an equilibrium for the
following values of v:
vam3D = minfvm3D; vnm3D g = vm3D < v < minfvm3U ; vnm3U g = vnm3D = vam3U
Region 4am
Merged entity M : the candidate equilibrium prices are in this case pm =
v  12 : The merged rmM may consider to change h of its k prices (1  h 
k). The two possible deviations are to higher prices: pi > v  12 or to a lower
prices: pi < v  12 . Suppose rstM considers to change h prices to pi > v  12 .
In this case, rms face a demand as if they were local monopolist on their
market segment. As all other rms stick to the candidate equilibrium prices,
such a potential deviation is not protable provided that:
dM
dp
=
kX
i=1
@i
@pi
dpi jpi>v  12 ;pm; pnm 0;8i 2 I
where dpi = 0 for all the remaining (k h) prices that are not changed. The
prots obtained from the deviation do not depend on h; hence:
v  vm4D = 1
Suppose now that M considers to change h prices to pi < v   12 . In
that case they face a demand given by the second expression in (2). The
potential deviation is not protable provided that:
dM
dp
=
kX
i=1
@i
@pi
dpi jpi<v  12 ;pm; pnm 0;8i 2 I
where dpi = 0 for all the remaining (k   h) prices that are not changed.
As the deviation prot increases in h, the most protable possible deviation
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takes place as h = k. The possible deviation should not lead to higher prots
than at the candidate equilibrium, requiring:
v  vm4U =
4N   n  k   2
2(2N   n  1) : (18)
It follows that the candidate prices are an equilibrium forM for the following
values of v: vm4D  v  vm4U :
Outsider rm j: the candidate equilibrium price for a representative
non-merged rm j (j 2 O) is pnm = v   12 ; an analogous reasoning can be
used to rule out possible deviations. Suppose that rm j considers raising
its price to pj > v   12 . In this case, the rm would face a demand as if it
was a local monopolist. The potential deviation is not protable provided
that:
@j
@pj
jpm;pnm;pj>v  12= pj
@Dj
@pj
+Dj jpm;pnm;pj>v  12 0;8j 2 O
which, as in the previous case, implies:
v  vnm4D = 1:
Suppose rm j consider decreasing the price to pj < v   1. In that case
the demand faced by the rm is given by the second expression in (3). The
potential deviation is not protable provided that:
@j
@pj
jpm;pnm;pj<v  12= pj
@Dj
@pj
+Dj jpm;pnm;pj<v  12 0;8j 2 O
which implies:
v  vnm4U =
4N   n  3
2 (2N   n  1) : (19)
It follows that the candidate prices are an equilibrium forM for the following
values of v: vnm4D  v  vnm4U :
By comparing (18) and (19), vnm4U is smaller than v
nm
4U so the candidate
prices constitute an equilibrium for the following values of v:
vam4D = maxfvm4D; vnm4D g  v  minfvm4U ; vnm4U g = vm4U = vam4U :
Q.E.D.
30
B Proof of Lemma 1
1) Existence of Region 1 requires: maxfvm1D; vnm1D ; vbm1Dg = v1D < v  v1U =
minfvm1U ; vnm1U ; vbm1U g: It is simple to show that: v1D = vm1D:
(i) A rst scenario implies: v1U = vm1U = minfvm1U ; vnm1U ; vbm1U g. This
requires vm1U  vnm1U and vm1U  vbm1U ; both of these are satised provided
that: N  12n3 8n2 8kn2 3k2n+10kn k2+k3 k2(2n 1)(2n k) . At the same time, this also
implies: vm1D < v
m
1U .
(ii) Another scenario is: v1U = vnm1U = minfvm1U ; vnm1U ; vbm1U g. This is the
case if vnm1U  vm1U and vnm1U  vbm1U , implying: 12n
3 8n2 8kn2 3k2n+10kn k2+k3 k
2(2n 1)(2n k)
 N  6n2 2n 3kn+2k k22(2n k) :
However, for Region 1 to exist we should also have vm1D < v
nm
1U which
requires N < 4n
3 8n2 k 3k2n+8kn
2(k 1)(2n k) : The latter is not binding if: n >
2k+1
4 +p
12k2 20k+9
4 :However, if k < n <
2k+1
4 +
p
12k2 20k+9
4 then:
12n3 8n2 8kn2 3k2n+10kn k2+k3 k
2(2n 1)(2n k)
 N < 4n3 8n2 k 3k2n+8kn2(k 1)(2n k) :
(iii) Finally, the last scenario is: v1U = vbm1U = minfvm1U ; vnm1U ; vbm1U g. This
is the case if vbm1U  vm1U and vbm1U  vnm1U implying: N  6n
2 2n 3kn+2k k2
2(2n k) :
However, for Region 1 to exist we should have vm1D < v
bm
1U which requires
N > 2n
3 6n2+4n+k2n+kn2+k2 kn 2k
2(k 1)(k+n 1) which is binding if: k < n <
2k+1
4 +p
12k2 20k+9
4 : However, it is not binding if: n >
2k+1
4 +
p
12k2 20k+9
4 :
2) Existence of Region 2 requires: maxfvm2D; vnm2D ; vbm2Dg = v2D  v 
v2U = minfvm2U ; vnm2U ; vbm2U g:
A simple comparison leads to establish that: v2D = max

vbm2D; v
nm
2D ; v
m
2D
	
=
vm2D and v2U = min

vbm2U ; v
nm
2U ; v
m
2U
	
= vbm2U = v
nm
2U : Moreover, it needs to be
checked that: v2D  v2U implying: N  n+ k 12 :
3) Existence of Region 3 requires: maxfvm3D; vnm3D ; vbm3Dg = v3D < v <
v3U = minfvm3U ; vnm3U ; vbm3U g:
A simple comparison leads to establish that: v3D = max

vm3D; v
nm
3D ; v
bm
3D
	
=
vm3D and v3U = min

vm3U ; v
nm
3U ; v
bm
3U
	
= vbm3U : Moreover, it needs to be checked
that: v3D < v3U implying: N > 5n+3k 18 +
p
n2+6n+9+21k2 6kn 30k
8 :
4) Existence of Region 4 requires: maxfvm4D; vnm4D ; vbm4Dg = v4D  v 
v4U = minfvm4U ; vnm4U ; vbm4U g:
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A simple comparison leads to establish that: v4D = max

vbm4D; v
nm
4D ; v
m
4D
	
=
vm4D = v
nm
4D = v
m
4D and v4U = min

vbm2U ; v
nm
2U ; v
m
2U
	
= vm4U : As k < n,
v4D  v4U is surely satised.
Q.E.D.
C Proof of Proposition 2
In Region 1 the di¤erence between the pre- and post-merger equilibrium
prices are:
pm   pbm =
(k   1) (n+ k   1) (2N   n  1)
(n  1) (n  k) (2n+ k   2)
pnm   pbm =
k (k   1) (2N   n  1)
(n  1) (n  k) (k + 2n  2)
As k < n, both are strictly positive. Then pam > pbm.
In Region 2 it is immediate to verify that pm = pnm = pbm = v   1.
In Region 3, the price di¤erentials are:
pm pbm = (k   1)
4N   3n+ k   1
4N   3n  1
2Nv   2nv + n  1
16N2   4Nk   20Nn  4N   k2 + 3kn+ 2k + 6n2 + 2n
and
pnm pbm =
k (k   1)
4N   3n  1
2Nv   2nv + n  1
16N2   4Nk   20Nn  4N   k2 + 3kn+ 2k + 6n2 + 2n
As k < n  N , both pm and pnm are higher than pbm.
In Region 4, pm = pnm = pbm = v   12 .
Q.E.D.
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